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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.      
  
 Charles Kelly, a police officer, appeals in this action 
involving his ongoing disputes with the appellees, the 
municipality which employs him and its chief of police, from the 
district court's order dismissing his complaint brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  The district court entered the order on the 
grounds that by reason of prior New Jersey administrative 
proceedings involving the subject matter of Kelly's current 
action, the New Jersey entire controversy doctrine barred this 
case and that, in any event, the complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.  Kelly v. Borough of 
Sayreville, 927 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.J. 1996).  Inasmuch as we hold 
that the district court properly dismissed the complaint on the 
latter ground, we need not consider the entire controversy 
ruling, though we note that we have significant reservations 
concerning the district court's disposition of that issue. 
 
 1. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction over Kelly's timely 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 





Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1408 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
considering this appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we 
accept Kelly's allegations as pleaded as true, and we draw all 
reasonable inferences in his favor.  See id. at 1405.  We can 
affirm the dismissal only if it is certain that Kelly cannot 
attain relief under any set of facts that he could prove.  See 
id. at 1408.  
 
 2. Background 
 On November 20, 1992, appellees, the Borough of 
Sayreville and its Chief of Police, Douglas Sprague, filed a 
formal written preliminary notice of disciplinary action against 
Kelly, a Sayreville police officer who serves as the president 
and employee representative of the Sayreville Policemen's 
Benevolent Association Local No. 98.  The disciplinary notice 
delineated 12 charges against Kelly and stated that Sayreville 
and Sprague were seeking his permanent removal from the police 
department.  In response, Kelly and the PBA filed an application 
for an order to show cause with temporary restraints and an 
unfair practice charge with the New Jersey Public Employment 
Relations Commission ("PERC") alleging that in bringing the 
charges the appellees violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee 
Relations Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (West 1988), 
and infringed Kelly's First Amendment free speech rights.   
 PERC issued an order to show cause on the application 





the order to show cause on February 17, 1993.  The examiner, 
however, did not restrain the prosecution of the disciplinary 
proceedings against Kelly because Sayreville agreed to postpone 
those proceedings pending the disposition of the PBA unfair 
practice charge.  A PERC hearing examiner then held hearings on 
the unfair practice charge on May 27 and 28, and June 3, 8, and 
17, 1993.  At these hearings, the PBA requested that PERC order 
the withdrawal of the disciplinary proceedings directed toward 
Kelly's removal from the police department. 
 On December 6, 1993, the examiner issued a report and 
recommendation finding that Sayreville had violated the New 
Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act.  He recommended that PERC 
order Sayreville to cease and desist from violating the Act, that 
the disciplinary charges against Kelly be withdrawn, and that 
Sayreville expunge any references to the charges from his 
personnel file.  H.E. No. 94-11, at 33-34 (Dec. 6, 1993).  On 
April 29, 1994, PERC issued its decision and order remanding the 
matter to the hearing examiner for clarification of his report 
and recommendation.  P.E.R.C. No. 94-104 (Apr. 28, 1994).  The 
examiner then issued a supplemental recommended order on July 22, 
1994.  H.E. No. 95-5 (July 22, 1994).  On May 24, 1995, PERC 
issued its final decision, incorporating the hearing examiner's 
findings and ordering that the disciplinary proceedings against 
Kelly be withdrawn and that Sayreville cease and desist from 
discriminating against Kelly on the basis of his actions in the 
performance of his duties as PBA president.  P.E.R.C. No. 95-97, 





considered Kelly's First Amendment claim on the merits, P.E.R.C. 
No. 94-104, at 3, and neither Kelly nor appellees appealed PERC's 
decision to the New Jersey courts.  
 On November 17, 1994, Kelly filed the complaint in this 
case in the district court seeking damages, alleging that the 
appellees violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their treatment of him.  
In particular, Kelly asserted that during his tenure as the PBA 
president the appellees subjected him to an unjustified 
continuous series of reprimands, disciplinary actions, reprisals, 
and job-related actions motivated by Sprague's personal dislike 
for and malice toward him.  Kelly asserted that the appellees' 
actions violated his liberty and property interests without due 
process of law.  Kelly claimed he therefore suffered substantial 
monetary loss, humiliation, damage to his reputation, and 
emotional and physical injury.  He did not specify, however, the 
basis for his claim of monetary loss, and thus he did not claim 
that he lost compensation or other employment benefits by reason 
of appellees' actions.  The district court complaint mirrors the 
PERC charges for Kelly acknowledges that "the specific factual 
allegations of [his] District Court complaint refer directly and 
specifically to the underlying facts and circumstances which were 
raised and litigated in the PERC administrative proceeding. . . 
.”  Br. at 10.  The administrative and district court proceedings 
differ, however, in that in the court action, unlike in the 
administrative proceeding, Kelly alleged a claim for damages for 





 The appellees filed a motion to dismiss which the 
district court granted by order of May 10, 1996, holding that 
because Kelly could have raised his federal constitutional claims 
before PERC, the New Jersey entire controversy doctrine barred 
his district court action.  Kelly, 927 F. Supp. at 805.  The 
district court also dismissed the complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Id. at 805-06.  
Kelly then filed this appeal.  As we have indicated, we address 
only the second ruling. 
  
 3. Discussion   
 Initially we point out that the district court found 
that Kelly had not responded to the motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Kelly, 927 
F. Supp. at 806.  The court nevertheless decided the motion on 
the merits rather than grant it as unopposed.  In these 
circumstances, we, too, will address the merits of the motion to 
dismiss. 
 In his complaint, Kelly asserted a section 1983 action 
based on the alleged violation of his rights under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  He 
claimed that the appellees injured him by repeatedly filing 
groundless disciplinary charges against him.  The district court 
held that Kelly could not state a claim for violation of his 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights.  Id. at 805-06.  In 
arriving at this result, it indicated that Kelly's Fifth 





the part of the federal government, his Sixth Amendment claim 
fails because he is not a criminal defendant, and his Eighth 
Amendment claim fails because he is not a convicted criminal 
defendant subjected to punishment in the context of criminal 
proceedings.  We will affirm these dispositions summarily because 
we agree with the district court that the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments are clearly not applicable here, and Kelly's remaining 
claims raise due process of law contentions which in this action 
against a municipality and one of its officials we consider under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The district court dismissed the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim on the ground that the appellees' 
action had not deprived Kelly of any liberty or property 
interest, and we will address that disposition at length. 
 On appeal, Kelly argues that his complaint sufficiently 
alleged the constitutional violations of which he complains.  He 
contends that "[a]ll of the required elements of [his] theory of 
injury and resulting harm are adequately set forth in the 
complaint."  Br. at 31.  In his complaint Kelly alleged damage to 
his liberty interest in his reputation and his property interest 
in his employment.  Appellees argue, however, that any reputation 
damage Kelly may have suffered due to their filing of 
disciplinary charges is not sufficient to support a cause of 
action for violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  They argue further that even if Kelly identified a 
right that their actions altered or extinguished, he cannot 
establish that his liberty interest in his reputation was 





They also contend that they did not injure his property 
interests.  For these reasons, they argue that the district court 
properly dismissed his claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
 "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a 
plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the 
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color 
of state law."  Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 
(3d Cir.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 165 (1995).  Inasmuch as the appellees 
undoubtedly acted under color of state law, our inquiry focuses 
on whether they violated Kelly's property or liberty interests.   
 State law creates the property rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 
617 (3d Cir. 1989) (looking to Pennsylvania law to determine 
whether police officer enjoys a property right in the retention 
of his assigned duties).  Thus, we must look to New Jersey law to 
determine what property interests Kelly enjoys in his employment 
as a police officer.  Under New Jersey law: 
[N]o permanent member or officer of the police 
department or force shall be removed from his 
office, employment or position for political 
reasons or for any cause other than incapacity, 
misconduct, or disobedience of rules and 
regulations established for the government of the 
police department and force, nor shall such member 
or officer be suspended, removed, fined or reduced 
in rank from or in office, employment, or position 
therein, except for just cause as hereinbefore 
provided and then only upon a written complaint 
setting forth the charge or charges against such 






N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147 (West 1993).  Kelly undoubtedly had 
a property interest in his position.  Furthermore, the appellees 
repeatedly filed disciplinary actions against Kelly so that they 
intended to interfere with that property interest.  Nevertheless, 
as Kelly conceded at oral argument before us, they never 
suspended, removed, fined, or reduced him in rank, and he 
suffered no loss of compensation by reason of these disciplinary 
actions.  Accordingly, while Kelly's complaint broadly asserts 
that he suffered substantial monetary loss, he has clarified his 
complaint to indicate that he seeks damages only for the 
continued pattern of harassment through the filing of groundless 
disciplinary charges, not for any particular adverse employment 
action.  We hold that in those circumstances he has not alleged a 
property loss so that his claim cannot survive the motion to 
dismiss. 
 Kelly cites Richardson v. Felix, 856 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 
1988), and Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd, 
898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990) (table), in support of his argument 
that he has asserted the deprivation of a protected property 
right.  Although Richardson and Perez support the unquestionably 
correct proposition that public employees may enjoy 
constitutionally protected property rights in their employment, 
Richardson, 856 F.2d at 509; Perez, 725 F. Supp. at 243, these 
cases are distinguishable as they involved interference with 
employment rights.  In Richardson the plaintiff was given the 
option of resigning or being terminated, so that the government 





it deprived him of that interest without prior notice or hearing. 
 Richardson, 856 F.2d at 505.  Similarly, in Perez the plaintiff 
was demoted for precluded political reasons and without required 
procedural protections.  We reiterate that in contrast the 
appellees never discharged or demoted Kelly, and he lost no 
compensation or other employment benefits by reason of their 
actions.  Accordingly, the appellees never deprived Kelly of a 
property interest in his employment, so he has failed to state a 
claim for deprivation of a property interest in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
 Kelly also argues that he was deprived of his liberty 
interest in his reputation.  Yet, as we explained in Clark v. 
Township of Falls, "reputation alone is not an interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause."  Clark, 890 F.2d at 619.  Clark 
relied on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976), 
which held that a plaintiff complaining that his liberty interest 
in his reputation has been injured states an actionable claim 
only if he has suffered an additional deprivation.  Accordingly, 
in Clark we held that because the plaintiff, a police lieutenant, 
had not demonstrated the deprivation of any protectable right 
beyond the injury to his reputation, he could not succeed on his 
constitutional claim.  Id. at 620.  In particular the plaintiff 
in Clark, like Kelly, maintained his rank within the police 
department.  Furthermore, we rejected the plaintiff's claim in 
Clark to the extent that he predicated it on an argument that the 
defendants' actions diminished his future employment prospects.  





future employment opportunities is patently insufficient to 
satisfy the requirement imposed by Paul that a liberty interest 
requires more than mere injury to reputation."  Clark, 890 F.2d 
at 620.  Here, inasmuch as Kelly has not suffered a deprivation 
beyond the injury to his reputation, he has not pleaded a valid 
claim based on a violation of his liberty interests.     
 In reaching our result, we point out that in Siegert v. 
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991), the 
Supreme Court relied on Paul v. Davis to hold that there is no 
constitutional liberty interest in one's reputation and that a 
claim that is essentially a state law defamation claim cannot 
constitute a claim for violation of one's federal constitutional 
rights.  Thus, we must be careful not to equate a state 
defamation claim with a cause of action under section 1983 
predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment.  See also Sturm v. Clark, 
835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (1987) ("Absent the alteration or 
extinguishment of a more tangible interest, injury to reputation 
is actionable only under state defamation law."); Robb v. City of 
Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Stigma to 
reputation alone, absent some accompanying deprivation of present 
or future employment, is not a liberty interest protected by the 
fourteenth amendment.").  Indeed, even financial injury due 
solely to government defamation does not constitute a claim for 
deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest.  Sturm, 835 
F.2d at 1013.  We emphasize that the crucial question is whether 
the plaintiff “has alleged the alteration or extinguishment of 





simply has not done so.  Therefore, his liberty interest claim, 
resting solely on the alleged injury to his reputation, is not 
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for 
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
 
 4. Conclusion 
 Kelly has failed to allege that appellees deprived him 
of a right cognizable under the Constitution, and he thus has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the complaint. 






KELLY v. BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, 96-5342 
McKEE, Concurring 
 
 I agree that this case should be affirmed for the 
reasons set forth by my colleagues and join their opinion.  
However, I believe the district court’s reliance on the entire 
controversy doctrine, as codified in New Jersey Court Rule 4:30A, 
is too important to ignore, and I would therefore also 
specifically hold that the district court erred in holding that 
Kelly’s suit is barred by that doctrine.   
 The district court dismissed the instant suit because 
Kelly and the Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”) had 
previously initiated a proceeding before the Public Employment 
Relations Commission (“PERC”).  In that proceeding they alleged 
that the Borough’s conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, 
and that the defendant's proposed disciplinary proceedings 
violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (the “Act”), and Kelly's First 
Amendment right to free speech
1
. PERC subsequently concluded that 
the Borough had violated the Act.  It recommended that the then - 
pending disciplinary proceeding against Kelly be withdrawn, that 
the defendants cease and desist from interfering with or 
discriminating against the PBA or Kelly, and that any related 
                     
     
1
 During the hearings before PERC, the unfair labor 






disciplinary matters be expunged from Kelly’s record.   The 
instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was filed before PERC issued 
its ruling, and the administrative claim was therefore still 
pending when this suit was filed.  The district court held that 
the entire controversy doctrine barred Kelly from bringing the 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the prior administrative 
action.   
The New Jersey entire controversy doctrine is 
a particularly strict 
application of the rule 
against splitting a cause 
of action.  Like all 
versions of that rule its 
purpose is to increase 
judicial efficiency.  
Thus it precludes not 
only claims which were 
actually brought in 
previous litigation, but 
also claims that could 
have been litigated in 
the previous litigation. 
  
Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The district court reasoned that Kelly had elected the 
administrative forum, that the proceedings before PERC were 
judicial in nature, and that Kelly had a fair opportunity to 
litigate his claims before PERC. Kelly, 927 F. Supp. at 803.  The 
district court concluded that “to allow Kelly to deliberately 
bypass New Jersey’s entire controversy rule would undermine the 
policy considerations at the center of the doctrine.”  Id. at 





 However,  PERC has a well-established practice of 
refusing to hear constitutional claims except insofar as they 
relate to statutory claims properly before it under the Act.  See 
Hunterdon Cent. High Sch. Bd. of Educ.v. Hunterdon Cent. High 
Sch. Teachers Ass’n, 416 A.2d 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) 
(holding that PERC did not exceed its authority in resolving, on 
a constitutional ground, a matter involving mandatorily 
negotiable terms in a teachers contract), aff’d. 429 A.2d 354 
(1981); see also In re Bd. of Educ., 494 A.2d 279 (N.J. 1985),  
and  Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6 (PERC's jurisdiction is limited 
to resolving statutory claims under the Act, and that 
“jurisdiction does not extend to resolving federal constitutional 
claims unless necessary to resolve such statutory claims.”).
2
 
  The district court erred in applying the entire 
controversy doctrine.  Our analysis of that doctrine under the 
facts before us is squarely controlled by Jones v. Holvey, 29 
F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1329 (1996).  
In Holvey, administrative charges were brought against a state 
inmate for possession of  a weapon in prison.  A hearing officer 
found Jones guilty of that offense. Jones unsuccessfully 
challenged that decision administratively and then appealed to 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  That 
                     
     
2
 The Public Employment Relations Commission filed an amicus 
curiae brief before this court to clarify the issue of its 
jurisdiction. It took no position as to the merits of the 





court reversed the decision of  the hearing officer and vacated 
all sanctions that had been imposed on Jones.   
 Jones then filed an action in federal court under 42 
U.S.C.  § 1983 in which he alleged that his right to due process 
had been violated in the administrative proceeding.  There, as 
here, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  The court held that Jones’s federal action 
under section 1983 was barred by the New Jersey entire 
controversy doctrine and the doctrine of res judicata.  “The 
court determined that Jones could have raised the section 1983 
claim . . . in the New Jersey State Court proceeding . . . .”  
Id. at 829.  Jones appealed to this court, and we reversed.  We 
held: 
[U]nder the entire controversy doctrine, a party will 
not be barred from raising claims 
that he could not have brought in 
the initial action.  As the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has stated, if 
the court in the first action would 
clearly not have had jurisdiction 
to entertain the omitted theory or 
ground (or, having jurisdiction, 
would clearly have declined to 
exercise it as a matter of 
discretion), then a second action 
in a competent court presenting the 
omitted theory or ground should not 






Id. at 831 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
3
  Here, 
the hearing examiner refused to hear Kelly’s First Amendment 
constitutional claim because that claim was not integral to the 
resolution of the labor dispute which was properly before the 
administrative body.  The district court held “because Kelly had 
a fair opportunity to have litigated his claims before PERC, the 
Court finds that the entire controversy doctrine applies to the 
case at hand.”  Kelly, 927 F. Supp. at 803.  That was error.  See 
Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 599 
(N.J. 1991).  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
    If, on the other hand, a claim could not have been 
presented in the first action, then 
it will not be precluded in a later 
action. . . .   If the plaintiffs 
could not have asserted both state 
and federal claims in a single 
forum, it would be unfair to force 
them to sacrifice the claims that 
could not be so asserted in order 
to bring a single action in one 
forum. 
 
Id. at 599. 
 
  It is even more clear here that the entire controversy 
doctrine should not preclude the federal action. In Holvey, we 
surmised that the Appellate Division would not have exercised 
jurisdiction of the federal claim based upon the “sparsity of the 
complaint.”  Id. at 832.  Here, the hearing examiner actually 
                     
     
3
 None of the parties cited Holvey in their briefs or 
argument before this court, and I can only assume that the 
district court was therefore also without the benefit of citation 





refused to hear Kelly’s First Amendment constitutional claim 
because that claim was not integral to the resolution of the 
labor dispute which was properly before the administrative body. 
 We need not guess. The federal claims Kelly asserts here were 
not adjudicated in the PERC proceeding.  Therefore, Kelly’s 
action in federal district court should not have become ensnared 
in the tentacles of the entire controversy doctrine. Holvey, 29 
F.3d at 831.  I believe that we should avail ourselves of this 
opportunity to define the parameters of this troublesome doctrine 
and clarify its operation.  Thus, although I join in the opinion 
of my colleagues, I write separately to express regret that we 
have missed an opportunity to start putting this jurisprudential 
genie back into its analytical bottle. 
